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In the last six months of WWII, the United States conducted a bombing campaign 
in Japan that would mark the world forever. Though a combination of engineering 
ingenuity, chemical creations, mass production, and racial profiling, the course of the war 
in the Pacific was fundamentally changed. Strategic bombing was a relatively new 
concept which only a handful of crucial figures were investigating into. In the pursuit of 
creating a fleet which would dominate the skies, it was the American government's 
intention to brutalize the Japanese until they gave into an unconditional surrender. While 
the usage of atomic bombs has been widely analyzed and criticized, few have looked into 
the usage of firebombs which wreaked havoc in Japan. The combination of 
dehumanization of the Japanese and a full mobilization of industry into achieving their 
goals, it is without any doubt, there were major ethical implications. In my thesis, it is my 
hope that through peering into the many factors that went into total destruction, that 
concepts like right and wrong, good and bad, are merely relative. Through the usage of 
primary and secondary sources, I sought out the forces which went into why decisions 
were made. The theory that was used at the time was that through swift actions to create a 
swift victory, it would ultimately lessen the suffering of violent conflict. Through acute 
research, this is not the case. It was the mentality that allowed people in culpable 
positions in the U.S. government that allowed justification for it, but this does not take 
away the horrendous nature of such actions. The crux of this campaign was on the night 
March 9, 1945 where the U.S. bombed Tokyo. It is clear that this was not only an effort 
to cripple the capital of Japan, but to make a statement to the rest of the world not to mess 
with them. It is my most humble opinion that the research which has been conducted will 





Key Words: Strategic bombing, firebombing, Curtis LeMay, Military Industry, B-29 bomber, 
















“For a child who did not know the true meaning of death or fear, March 10 was my first 
experience of that.”1 Katusmote Sautome was ten years old when 345 B-29 superbombers 
mercilessly firebombed the capital of Japan and his family's home. He was awakened in the 
middle of the night, and with his family gazed upwards to see the bombers sail across the sky. “I 
could see the crimson flames from the ground reflected in the silvery metal underbellies of the 
aircraft.”2 On the night of March 9th, 1945, the US Army Air Corp, under the command of 
General Curtis LeMay flew 345 bombers on a mission to destroy much of Tokyo, the capital of 
Imperial Japan. This is what the ten-year old Sautome and his family were watching.   
 The firebombing of Tokyo, code-named Operation Meetinghouse is considered the 
deadliest air raid in human history. It is estimated that there were 100,000 civilian casualties and 
over a million people displaced from their homes. Throughout the course of the last six months 
of the war in the Pacific the United States brought untold misery onto 90 different Japanese cities 
through means of bombing raids using fire bombs. This was a part of a much larger effort by the 
United States government to force Japan into an unconditional surrender, by strategically 
bombing them. In the effort of the government to do so, they developed and manufactured 
thousands of aircrafts that would be capable of completing such missions, invested resources into 
developing a bomb that would bring maximum damage to civilians, and effectively burn parts of 
Japan to the ground. All of this was executed properly by General Curtis E. LeMay, a well-
known general who is credited with the successful bombing campaign in the Pacific. He was one 
 
1Motoko Rich. “The Man Who Won’t Let The World Forget The Firebombing of Tokyo.” Beyond The World War 
II We Know. New York Times. March 9, 2020 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/09/magazine/the-man-who-wont-
let-the-world-forget-the-firebombing-of-tokyo.html?searchResultPosition=1 
2  Ibid, Sautome remembers looking up and seeing the flames on the ground reflect off of the aircraft as a way of 
describing just how low flying they were - later on it is discussed why the aircrafts had to fly so low 
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of the strongest proponents of strategic bombing against many adversaries, but his success 
proved him right as far as effectiveness and efficiency were concerned. It was his philosophy that 
“the most moral way to win a war, is through evisceration of your enemy as quickly as possible 
to reduce suffering.”3 Robert McNamara, a future secretary of defense, who during World War II 
was just a bombing analyst under LeMay, reflected on this philosophy in the 2003 documentary, 
The Fog Of War, quite differently.4  In the interview for the documentary McNamara argued that 
the action the U.S. government took in the pursuit of victory were inhumane, and if the U.S. had 
lost the war, they would have been tried as a war criminals.  
Chronology of U.S. Entering The war 
The chronology of World War II is important in understanding the U.S. position when 
assessing the actions that were taken in Japan primarily during the end of the war in 1945. After 
WWI ended, public sentiment was against going to war in foreign conflicts. People were worried 
that the arms industry had undermined American neutrality in World War I. As a result, 
Congress established the Nye Committee.5 During this time, book titles like Merchants of Death 
were very popular.6 Prior to the United States entering the war two years later, the rise of fascism 
in Europe and especially the Third Reich had been a major concern for US policy makers. The 
Roosevelt government needed to convince the American public that going to war was the only 
 
3  Thomas Searle, “It Made A Lot Of Sense To Kill Skilled Workers.” Journal of Military History, Vol. 66 (January 
2002) 12 https://www.jstor.org/journal/jmilitaryhistory 
4 A documentary released in 2003, directed by Errol Morris, it received the best documentary film of the year.  
5  The Nye Committee was established April 12th, 1934 and it was chaired by U.S. Senator Gerald Nye. It was 
known as a special committee on investigating the munitions industry. The committee investigated the dealings 
between the industry and bankers with their reported profits from promoting foreign wars. Their goal was to 
nationalize the munitions industry to make sure oversight was placed. There were 93 hearings conducted in which 
200 plus witnesses testified. The Nye Committee ultimately failed in their goal to nationalize the arms industry, 
however it inspired three congressional neutrality acts which signaled profound American opposition to overseas 
involvement. 
6 An epithet used in the U.S. during the 1930’s to attack and criticize the industries and banks that supplied and 
funded WWI. H.C. Englelbrecht and F.C. Hanighen wrote a book in 1934 called Merchants of Death which 
expounded on the “evils” of the armament industry. 
5 
option to defend the American way of life. But it was not until the Japanese attacked Pearl 
Harbor on December 7th, 1941 that the U.S. was able to fully mobilize. While it was the 
Japanese who attacked the U.S. and brought them into the war, the U.S. stuck to its “Germany 
First” policy. The United States' efforts were focused on defeating the Nazis from 1941-1945, in 
a joint coalition with the other Allied powers. It is a common misconception that the U.S. was 
militarily superior to other countries at this time, and actually the better half of the war in the 
Pacific was spent in U.S. retreat. One of the most notable American retreats was the withdrawal 
from the Philippines. The Japanese launched a campaign in 1941 and 1942 where they attempted 
to conquer the Philippines from the Americans. While the Americans outnumbered the Japanese, 
it was a decisive defeat and is considered one of the greatest military failures in American 
military history.7  
The campaign in Europe was vastly different than the campaign in the Pacific. The 
Japanese planes and naval presence were superior in every fashion in the earlier years of the war. 
They had more aircraft carriers, more troops occupying islands in the Pacific, and the Japanese 
Zero was considered superior until the development of the p-51 mustang which equaled the zeros 
capabilities. 8 To best understand how the United States got to the point of firebombing Tokyo, 
along with ninety other Japanese cities, it is critical to know about Curtis LeMay and how he 
became the man he was, the factors that went into creating the B-29 super bomber, the 
development of the firebomb, and strategic bombing.  Only then can we understand that warfare 
in World War II truly was determined by technological ingenuity and industrial production. The 
 
7 Michael Sherry. The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1987) 103 
8 The Japanese Zero was the name of the primary airplane used in combat. The reason for the nickname “zero” was 
because the Japanese imperial symbol was on the side of all airplanes, a red circle, thus leading American troops to 
dub it as a zero. 
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fate of the world hung in the balance. What were the motivations and justifications offered by the 
United States government and the entire American war machine to use the strategies and tactics 
they did in Japan? How did ordinary Americans react to the news of bombing civilians? These 
questions go back to the heart of LeMay’s philosophy: is bombing really the best and most moral 
way to win a war?  
The Factor of Race In Wartime 
Following the defeat of the Germans in Europe in the spring of 1945, the United States 
turned their full efforts onto defeating the Japanese. To the Americans, fighting the Germans 
who were white, Christian, and promoted anti-Semitism, had not been as popular in the U.S. as 
fighting the Japanese. Thus creating war propaganda against the Japanese was much easier. In 
1945, a film directed by Frank Capra called Know Your Enemy: Japan [there was another one 
called, Know Your Enemy: Germany] was released. This film depicts Japanese history from the 
late 14th century onward. The U.S. Department of War commissioned the film, and it depicts 
Japanese society and history as militaristic and totalitarian. “Know Your Enemy was a potpourri 
of most of the English speaking world's dominant clichés about the Japanese enemy, including 
the crudest, most vulgar, and most blatantly racist approach.” 9 The purpose of this film was to 
educate American soldiers on Japanese history as a means to dehumanize the enemy, to make 
them not only an enemy in regards to political reasons, but to portray Japanese as savages. This 
film was released three years after the wildly controversial start of Japanese-American 
internment camps in the United States which began on February 19th, 1942. These internment 
camps were built to relocate and incarcerate all Japanese Americans to monitor their loyalty and 
to re-educate them.10 
 
9 John Dower. War Without Mercy: Race And Power In The Pacific War . (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986) 20 
10 Decreed by President Roosevelt in executive order 9066 
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 During the war, there were no internment camps for German Americans, or Italian 
Americans, which leads to the conclusion that the creation of these camps were solely racially 
motivated. However, precedent had been set to legalize the actions of the U.S. government to do 
something like this. In World War One there were a string of Supreme Court cases that led to 
defending the government's rights to more extreme measures to be taken during great national 
security crises.  
 By the time World War II had rolled around, the U.S government's attitude had stayed the 
same. Even though there had been an intense backlash against 1917 and US involvement in war 
and the hysteria and curtailment of democratic rights it had brought about, the country saw a 
replay of it in World War II. Since internment camps were created in the name of national 
security, it was considered that anyone who opposed them had ulterior motives to support the 
Japanese empire. One of the most prominent supreme court cases to take place was Korematsu v 
United States (323 U.S.214, 1944) which upheld the exclusion of Japanese Americans from the 
West Coast Military Area during World War II.11  
These camps led to an increase in racial incidents towards not only Japanese Americans, 
but all Asian Americans during the war. There are many counts of Chinese-Americans, Korean-
Americans, Vietnamese-Americans etc. who dealt with racial backlash from propaganda against 
the Japanese. All across the country signs would go up on restaurants saying “no Japs allowed”.  
 
 
11 "Korematsu v. United States." Oyez. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/323us214. A Japanese-American 
man living in San Leandro, Fred Korematsu, chose to stay at his residence rather than obey the order to relocate. 
Korematsu was arrested and convicted of violating the order. He responded by arguing that Executive Order 9066 









At the same time though, the Japanese government also invested heavily in anti-
American propaganda. “In the late 1930’s the Spiritual Culture Institute was created by the 
ministry of education explicitly to perfect and unify the entire nation with one conviction.”13 The 
Japanese government took pride in being different than westerners, and while Americans focused 
on individualism, the Japanese were seen as a unified people. “During the years of the war, the 
Japanese government's propaganda, for internal and external consumption, harped incessantly on 
100 million hearts beating as one, the 100 million people as one bullet, 100 million as 
innumerable monolithic entities.”14 It was propaganda like this from the Japanese that threatened 
and terrified many Americans to the point where Japanese Americans were considered working 
with the enemy, and that they were a part of this unified entity set out to dominate the world and 
destroy America. Ironically, it was also the point of the Japanese government to inspire fear into 
their citizens that the Americans were set out to conquer the world and destroy Japan.15  
 
12 A photograph taken at a cafe that had put up a sign that no Japs will be served at their establishment. Taken in 
1942 
13 Dower, War Without Mercy, 31  
14 Ibid 30 
15 Ibid 34 
9 
The stark contrasts in lifestyles and culture led to a brutal racial campaign by both sides 
as a means to mobilize against one another. This was much more pertinent between the 
Americans and Japanese than any other conflicting countries throughout the entire war. As a 
result of this relentless racial campaign, it led to bombing fanatics to mercilessly destroy over 90 
Japanese cities. 
Background of Bombing 
 Through a full mobilization effort to racialize the conflict between the Japanese and the 
American Government set out for the best ways to defeat them as quickly as possible. Due to the 
fact that the Japanese fought fiercely and defended their home with their lives, the Americans 
were constantly looking for ways to mitigate American casualties. Kamikaze missions and 
concepts like “for every one Japanese soldier who dies, he must bring ten Americans with him” 
radicalized the Japanese war effort and in doing so scared Americans.16 By the time the 
Americans had conquered most of the Mariana, it was critical to subdue them at the source, 
Japan. President Truman knew that a land invasion of Japan would lead to the deaths of tens of 
millions of Americans which would have been devastating on the home front, potentially costing 
the war.17 It was because of this fact, that the U.S had set out to accomplish a means to defeat the 
Japanese without a land invasion. The solution was bombing. This ideology is what drove 
LeMay into becoming a bombing fanatic.18 
Bombing was a relatively new concept. It was first theorized by an Italian general named 
Giulio Douhet. He thought of the possibility of air machines becoming the new center of 
 
16 Kamikaze missions were missions where Japanese pilots would have funerals pre mission, and they would only 
fuel their plane up with enough fuel to reach their target, and once they arrived, would intentionally crash their plane 
into the target as a means of inflicting as much damage as possible.  
17 U.S. Government, “U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey In The Pacific” (Secretary of War Department, 1944) 7  
18 Sherry, The Rise of American Airpower, 69 
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warfare. He authored a book called The Command of The Air, 1921. At this time the airplane had 
only been used in the World War I as a means of reconnaissance or in dogfights which were 
primarily used as propaganda. This is not what Douhet and other air fanatics had in mind when 
envisioning air power at its full force. There is no way for the civilian population to protect itself 
from the rain of bombs that comes without warning, just pure acceptance that one's life is now 
out of one's own hands. But at the start of World War II it was understood by both Allied and 
Axis strategists, industrialists, and leaders alike that it would be bombing that decided the war.  
The war in Europe had already gone on for almost two years before the Americans 
officially entered. The Axis powers and Allied powers alike were trying to bomb one another 
into oblivion. This began with the Luftwaffe raids in Poland in 1939, France in 1940, the U.K. 
through 1941. In fact in 1937, before the war broke out, the Germans bombed Guernica during 
the Spanish civil war on April 26th, 1937. This was one of the first instances of bombing raids. 
This established precedence for the U.S. Government to justify the mass production in 
manufacturing bombers. It was never about dogfighters and World War One aces, but about the 
ability to amass a fleet of capable machines to carry out raids that would spare millions of men 
on a battlefield.19  
 
Who Was Curtis LeMay? 
Curtis LeMay was born on November 15th, 1906 in Columbus Ohio. His father was a 
handyman and his mother worked around the house. There is a famous story that LeMay would 
tell people about how when he was only five years old, he looked up in the sky for the first time 
 
19 U.S. Government, “U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey In The Pacific” 3 
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and saw an airplane. As a little boy, he was fascinated by the flying machine, and he chased after 
it not understanding that he could never keep up with it due to the plane being miles high in the 
sky. He wanted to catch it but never came close, and eventually it disappeared into the horizon.20 
His father could never hold a job for more than a few months at a time, so income was fairly 
limited in the LeMay household. They were constantly moving around the country so that his 
father could find work, but nothing ever really stuck. By the time he enrolled into high school, 
the family had moved back to Columbus. After high school he attended college at Ohio State 
University where he graduated with a degree in civil engineering. In his last couple years of 
college, he joined up with the newly created Air Corp department in the United Armed Forces. 
At this time, the Air Corp was a part of the Army, there was no separate Air Force branch.21 In 
October of 1929 he received the commission of second lieutenant in Air Corps reserves. In 1930, 






LeMay was one of the first men in this time to receive specialized training regarding 
 
20 Malcolm Gladwell, The Bomber Mafia, Pushkin Industries (Podcast), July 9, 2020 
http://revisionisthistory.com/episodes/45-the-bomber-mafia 
21 Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power, 8 
22 A term used to describe a fighter pilot 
23 A photograph of Curtis LeMay 
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aerial navigation. In 1937 LeMay showed that his training had paid off during a combat training 
mission run by the U.S. Navy. The objective behind this mission was that LeMay and a couple 
other pilots while flying a Boeing B-17 flying fortress (predecessor of the B-29 super fortress) 
were to locate a ship and bomb it. It took LeMay a whole lot of convincing the joint chiefs that 
this training exercise was worthwhile. There had been a lot of push back from military leaders 
and politicians early on before the start of World War II who were stuck in the ways of 
traditional warfare which was exclusive to land and sea combat.24 Investing money into bombers 
seemed like a waste of resources and time. LeMay and other bombing fanatics were determined 
to convince them otherwise, and to do so he would prove that bombers could in fact be accurate 
when all odds were against them. On a cloudy misty day off the coast of California in August 
1937, LeMay under the command of Major General Caleb V. Haynes helped hunt down from the 
sky the USS Utah and nail the target with water bombs.25 This success was in spite of the fact 
that the Navy had given incorrect coordinates to Haynes and his crew, but with the style and 
knowledge LeMay provided to his crew, they made the necessary adjustments and executed with 
precision. It is said that some sailors actually got injured that day from the bomb, and when 
LeMay was asked about it, he said “my job was to find and bomb the USS Utah, and so I did.”26  
LeMay was the type of man who no one wanted to mess around with. He never gave 
grandiose battle speeches, he was not kind or sympathetic with his words. Curtis E. LeMay was 
the man the U.S. Government called when they needed a problem solved. Without pride or 
prejudice he solved problems. He did not take failure as an answer and through whatever means 
 
24 RJ Overy. The Air War 1939-1945 (New York: Stein And Day Publishing Co. 1980) 5  
25 Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power, 61 
26 Malcolm Gladwell, “The Bomber Mafia.” Pushkin Industries (Podcast), http://revisionisthistory.com/episodes/45-
the-bomber-mafia    
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necessary would establish a solution for a problem, no matter how he got there. His type was old 
school, the toughest man on the block, and by the time he was in command of his own unit, his 
men were well aware of it.27 
 LeMay best proved this during his service in Germany in 1943. He was in command of a 
fleet of B-24 bombers who were responsible for various raids. During this time, the Air Force 
was reporting that planes had a 40% return rate from missions. This fact scared many men and 
actually resulted in a significant drop in pilots engaging in their missions for fear that they would 
not return. When LeMay became aware of this fact, he gathered all of his men and told them that 
any man who did not do his job, would return to a firing squad for treason. LeMay is famously 
known for saying “I would never ask my men to do something that I was not prepared to do 
myself.”28 From that point on, LeMay flew in the lead bomber for 22 missions. This led to a 
100% engagement rate and significantly lessened the casualties. To the men who served under 
LeMay, he was unwavering. 
Building The B-29  
 LeMay and his bombing tactics were in desperate need of a bomber capable of 
performing at the level necessary to produce the results LeMay wanted to see. It is critical to 
understand how the B-29 bomber was developed to give context to one of the most important 
creations during the war. In 1940, one year before the United States would enter the war, 
President Roosevelt knew it was critical to begin preparations for the inevitability that they 
would enter. Germany’s success in conquering European countries so quickly prompted 
 
27 Ibid  
28 Ibid  
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Roosevelt to  call for a joint congressional meeting on May 16th, 1940. This meeting was to 
discuss the production capacity of at least 50,000 planes a year, a standing force of naval and 
military aircraft of the same size, and renewed congressional commitment to the sale of aircraft 
to Britain and France. 29 This dramatic turn in policy enabled the American war machine. The 
reaction of the policy was “calculated to shock the American public into rethinking fundamental 
assumptions about national security.”30 The American public had initially imagined, like in 
World War One, that the U.S. would stay neutral from what was perceived to be European 
affairs. Roosevelt's address to Congress was designed to incite fear in the American public. They 
were forced to come to the realization that the only reason mobilization of this magnitude was 
necessary if they believed an attack was imminent. Charles Lindbergh also played a more direct 
and sinister role in the lead up to Pearl Harbor. As part of the America First Committee, and 
having visited Nazi Germany repeatedly, indeed having a family there, he warned the U.S. stood 
no chance against Nazi Luftwaffe.  While this took place almost a decade earlier, war breaking 
out worried many Americans that the Nazis would be just as capable to send a fleet of their own 
bombers and attack the home front. This was utilized as propaganda by the U.S. government as a 
tool of fear towards the public. “They took the blitz of London and offered this as a reality to 
New York or D.C.”31   
The war in which so many fought, was ultimately decided by manufacturing and 
ingenuity, who could build the most bombers? It was a simple equation for industrialists, a 
mathematical problem. The most important independent variable was time. By the end of the 
war, it was determined that Germany and Japan had not produced enough planes at the rate in 
 
29 Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power, 91  
30 Ibid 91 
31 Ibid  95  
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which would have lead them to succeed.32 When we compare the figures between the Allied 
power production of bombers versus the Axis we can see the vast differences.  
 Allied Total Production of Bombers Per Year Axis Total Production of Bombers Per Year 
1939 24,178 14,562 
1940 39,518 16,815 
1941 64,706 19,264 
1942 101,519 26,670 
1943 151673 43,100 
1944 167,654 67,987 
1945 84,806 18,606 
33  
As can be seen by these figures the allied powers (USSR, USA, Britain) were out 
producing the Axis (Germany, Japan, Italy) the entire time, but in the 40’s it really wasn’t even 
close. This is vastly attributed to the U.S. which were accounting for the majority of production 
for the allies. The United States accounted for just about 50% of the total number of planes 
produced during the war. They built 304,090 planes out of the total 608,895.34There are many 
things that factored into this, but the most important takeaway is that U.S. manufacturing blew 
away all competition. The mobilization effort by the U.S. was like nothing the world had ever 
seen before. All the while this created hundreds of thousands of jobs in the United States which 
stimulated the economy. Roosevelt's decree for 50,000 planes a year catapulted this country into 
the war machine that would terrify Japan in a few years to come.  
 
32 RJ Overy, The Air War 1939-1945, 151  
33 Ibid 152 








Although the United States dominated in production numbers, that was only the first part 
of winning. The next step was a much more complex problem to solve. It wasn’t just about 
making the most, but making the best. It was actually Charles Lindbergh who convinced General 
Henry Arnold that the U.S. needed to produce a brand new super plane to counter the Nazi 
production. The pursuit to the B-29 was a long and arduous process. Initially the contract was 
placed at a competitive price for production companies all over the country. Big manufacturers 
like Lockheed Martin and Douglas Co. were in the race for the contract, but they eventually gave 
up after some difficulties. In December 1939, the Air Corps issued a formal specification for a 
so-called "super bomber", that could deliver 20,000 lbs. (9,100 kg) of bombs to a target 2,667 mi 
(4,292 km) away and at a speed of 400 mph (640 km/h).36 The task was awarded to the Boeing 
manufacturing company. It was their job to build the greatest plane the world had ever seen.  
In January of 1925, Lloyd Stearmen, Walter Beech, and Clyde Cessena established the 
 
35 A photograph of a manufacturing plant in Wichita Kansas building the B-29 circa 1942 
36  U.S. Government, “U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey In The Pacific” 7 
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Travel Air Manufacturing Company in Wichita Kansas.37 This plant opened with intentions to 
build planes for all purposes. Lloyd Stearmen actually left this company to establish his own, 
Stearmen Aircraft Corporation. This was acquired by a holding company for Boeing in 1929. In 
1938 it acquired its first major military contract, and later that year Stearmen had become an 
official division of the Boeing company. In 1941 it officially became known as The Wichita 
Division of The Boeing Airplane Company. Boeing's new "Plant II" was in partial operation by 
June of 1942. Building a new plant was a formidable task, but staffing it with sufficient numbers 
of trained workers was equally difficult. People were recruited from all over Kansas and 
neighboring states. A mammoth recruiting, training, and job placement task eventually created a 
skilled workforce. There were problems faced by the thousands of subcontractors that also had to 
expand and train their workforces across the country.38  
Developing Napalm  
 In the same chronological fashion of building the B-29, it also had occurred to military 
specialists that they needed to create the weapons that the B-29 would ultimately deliver. It was 
an equally important task to vanquishing the enemy. A couple of years before the United States 
had entered the war in 1937, a meeting took place at Harvard University. There were many 
important individuals who attended the meeting that day, but the two most notable were Louis 
Feizer and Hoyt C. Hottel. Both of these men were in the top of the field of chemistry. This 
meeting was put together by the National Defense Research Committee (NRDC). The task of 
this meeting was to identify the best way to burn things down. Their task was to reexamine the 
 
37 Sherry, “The Rise of American Power” 126  
38 Ibid 168  
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lethal qualities of thermo combustion. In Hottel’s own words “we needed to learn more about 
incendiary bombs.”39 In their attempt to do so, they proposed a competition of sorts. The 
parameters of this competition were to see who could create the best and most effective 
incendiary bomb. They called this competition “Hottels Bake Off”. The biggest names in 
industrial manufacturing got involved with this competition. The importance of this contest was 
paramount to winning the war.40 
 On May 28th, 1941 at a NRDC scientific conference in Chicago, Feizer heard of a 
peculiar incident that took place at a DuPont chemical plant. A group in one of their research 
divisions was working with a compound called divinyl acetylene, its hydrocarbon, an oil bi 
product. When mixed with a pigment, the product would turn into a tough adhesive film, 
however the film kept bursting in flames. This caught Feizer’s attention at the conference, and he 
immediately went to work with it. During their experimentations of it, they learned that the 
liquid gradually changed into a sticky viscous gel. It was discovered by Hottel and Feizer that 
when a viscous gel burns, it does not become fluid, it retains its gel and stickiness and continues 
to burn.41 They took this and began running tests to see what burned best with it. Initially they 
tried using divinyl acetylene, which burned well, but it was not as effective as they were hoping. 
Finally they tried it with gasoline, which worked exceptionally well. In addition, they added 
aluminum palmitate and aluminum naphthenate. This is where the term Napalm originates from, 
and it was from the combination of these key elements that it became the weapon of choice for 
the United States Air Force. The next task was to turn Napalm into a bomb. To do this, they 
 






inserted a stick of TNT with a layer of white phosphorus wrapped around the middle of a 
canister filled with napalm. Phosphorus burns at a high temperature, so the TNT would go off 
and send the gel everywhere which had been set aflame by the initial explosion. The container 
they used was initially created for holding mustard gas. The weapon the NRDC was searching 






Strategic Bombing  
With the bomb to create destruction, the plane to carry it to the target, and the man 
willing to spearhead the entire operation, we are now at the point where the tactic to put it all 
together was formulated. Strategic bombing as determined by the United States Army Air Force 
(USSAF), dictated a specific tactical doctrine of how the USAAF was going to go about 
achieving their goals. It was decided that large formations of heavily armed bombers would fight 
their way through the enemy’s defenses and conduct very precise bombing in daylight to destroy 
 
42 A chart describing the design of a napalm bomb that was used 
20 
carefully selected targets.43 One of the major problems that the USAAF faced early on in the war 
was there was no feasible way to bomb Japan due to the distance that would need to be travelled. 
It was too far of a distance for any plane at the time to make it to the target and back without 
running out of fuel. The U.S. Navy only had so many aircraft carriers that could only carry so 
many bombers, so it wasn’t an option to launch major air raids from the sea. There is one 
instance in which they did just that, and that was right after Pearl Harbor, The Doolittle Raid.44 
In efforts to create a strategic plan to target Japan, it made the most sense to conquer the islands 
that surround Japan. Once the islands were conquered, the USAAF would begin constructing 
runways where operations would be run from. The idea was, the more islands could be 
conquered, the more bases they could build and bomb Japan from. The closer the island was to 







43 Thomas Searle, “It Made A Lot of Sense To Kill Skilled Workers” 4  
44 The Doolittle raid was put together by Lt. Colonel James Doolittle, this operation was a one way mission to bomb 
Tokyo. It had minimal tactical effects and was done more so to send a message to Japan that the U.S. would get its 
revenge on behalf of Pearl Harbor.  
45 A photograph of an air strip built in Okinawa in 1945 
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There were two key islands which the United States needed to occupy in order to run the 
most effective campaign from. These two islands were Okinawa and Iwo Jima.46 Okinawa was 
taken April 1st, 1945. Iwo Jima was taken on February 19th, 1945. Okinawa is approximately 
400 miles away from Japan, and Iwo Jima is about 1,032 miles away. Once these islands were 
taken, the U.S. was perfectly positioned to run an uninterrupted campaign against Japan. They 
were for the most part uninterrupted because the Japanese imperial navy was all but destroyed by 
this point in the war, which meant there weren’t going to be any significant efforts to reconquer 
the island due to the Japanese not having the ability to bring men there. However the Japanese 
resorted to the ruthless tactic of Kamikaze missions to attack U.S. ships. This was both effective 
and frightening for American navy men who feared the possibility of being subjected to this fate. 
Before these islands were taken, the U.S. was running the majority of its raids from China.47 The 
USAAF saw very little success from these bombing raids. There were a number of factors that 
went into this. Bombers were basically guessing when to drop on their targets, and the second 
was that the jet stream patterns from Japan into China were completely messing up the bombers 
strategic plans on when and where to drop the bombs.48  
The bombing raids originated from bases built in China.  After islands in the Pacific were 
conquered, the USAAF moved operations to the Pacific. General Wolfe was in charge of 
operations based in China, while General Hansell was placed in charge of operations from the 
 
46 The reason the picture of the Marines raising the flag became such a prominent piece of American propaganda 
was because after the island was taken, it became a cornerstone in the victory. The most important were that the 
Norden bomb sight was not effective at seeing through the foggy skies in Japan 
47Thomas Searle, “It Made A Lot Of Sense To Kill Skilled Workers”, 9 
48 RJ Overy The Air War 1939-1945, 100 
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Islands. Curtis LeMay replaced Wolfe on July 4, 1944. The first wave of bombing waves in 
Japan initially began with a zero percent success rate up until January of 1945. They were 
focused on high altitude, daylight precision bombing. The principal cause for the inaccuracies 







   50 
There were two types of methods used by the USAAF during the war that were believed 
the best way to bring victory. These methods were area bombing and precision bombing. These 
tactics both utilized incendiary bombs, but for different purposes. Precision bombing was a 
concept where in order to best utilize forces, it was required to pre-determine key spots to target 
on any given raid which would weaken the enemy.51 This was all created in the precision 
bombing doctrine which air power fanatics had conjured up during the war. 52 This meant 
 
49Thomas Searle, “It Made A Lot Of Sense To Kill Skilled Workers”,14  
50 A map which shows which islands belonged to the Japanese.  
51 Michael Sherry Rise of American Air Power, 57 
52 Ibid 58 
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targeting aqueducts, specific manufacturing sites, military bases etc. The thought process behind 
pre-determining your targets was that through maximizing the damage done to necessary 
elements of an operating country, it would force them into submission with minimal civilian 
casualties. Precision bombing seemed like the best method to use, however in practice was much 
more difficult than expected. Due to all of the challenges the Air Force had been dealing with, it 






Since precision bombing was not working as it was intended to, area bombing was the 
next step to success. The thought process behind area bombing was to completely level 
everything in sight.54 Bombers would take off from their base with the intent to strike a general 
area and release thousands of tons of napalm over that area. This took the humanitarian factor 
completely out of the equation.55 By enabling pilots to engage in this practice, there would be an 
increase in civilian casualties, but there wouldn’t be any worry of whether or not their target was 
hit. Precedent had already been set by the Allied powers in Europe during the bombing campaign 
 
53 A photograph of a bombing raid in Osaka 1945 
54Thomas Searle, “It Made A Lot Of Sense To Kill Skilled Workers”,8  
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against Germany. Specifically the bombing of Dresden on February 13th, 1945. Once they had 
levelled Dresden, it became clear to military officials like Haywood Hansell, Curtis LeMay, and 
Douglas MacArthur that the same tactics should be applied in Japan.56 
 It was also strategically advantageous to the USAAF that Japanese cities were made 
mostly out of wood and the U.S. knew exactly what they were getting themselves into when the 
green light was given on area bombing. LeMay knew this, and in 1945, was promoted  
Operation Meetinghouse 
Now that the USAAF could plan missions with goals of pure destruction, the strategy 
around enabling this was a much simpler game plan. It had been common practice for the 
USAAF to run bombing missions from high altitudes making it almost impossible for Japanese 
anti-aircraft guns to shoot them down.57  This caused an issue however for American bomber 
crews who were having difficulties with the Japanese jet streams which were creating a much 
more difficult time for bombers to execute their mission. Missions were also usually run in broad 
daylight to give bomber crews the best probability of being able to see their target.  In early 
March the USAAF high command met to discuss a coordinated raid on four major Japanese 
cities: Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe.58 Due to the issues the bombers were having, LeMay 
made a series of decisions that would break the USAAF procedure. The first was a series of night 
attacks would be made on major Japanese cities. The second was that bombing would be carried 
out from five thousand to eight thousand feet. The third was that no armament or ammunition 
 
56 Ibid 77 
57 Edwin Hoyt. Inferno: The Firebombing of Japan, March 9th-August 15th, 1945, (Oxford: England Madison 
Books, 2000) 5  
58 Ibid 8 
25 
would be carried and the size of the crews will be reduced accordingly. The fourth was that all 
aircraft will attack individually. Finally, that Tokyo will be the first target.59. The first three out 
of the five commands had broken proper USAAF command. Night missions were considered 
dangerous, bombing at such a low altitude defeated the purpose of the B-29’s high altitude 
capabilities, and removing the machine guns and ammunition from the planes, left them 
defenseless. However, LeMay saw these changes as promising for a successful raid. He said 
“I’m removing the ammunition because I’m afraid that the crews will be shooting at each other 
more than the Japs. Then we’ll save three thousand pounds, which will give us another ton and a 
half of bombs. This meant a 65 percent increase in bomb capacity.”60  The pilots on this mission 
were initially shocked by the news of LeMay's commands. To them, going on a mission without 
machine guns to defend themselves seemed suicidal. But the men trusted LeMay, and he had not 
steered them wrong this far, so they went with it. To boost morale, LeMay had a meteorologist 
tell the men that there would be high winds when the mission began, which meant the incendiary 
bombs would create fires that would spread out farther.61  
 The mission began at the Guam air strip at around 10 pm on March 9, 1945 . Tokyo was 
approximately 1,500 miles away, and the 314th was off carrying thousands of tons of napalm. By 
midnight the first wave of the 314th had arrived in Tokyo flying below ten thousand feet. The 
Japanese air defenders were on high alert that night, scouring the skies at approximately 30,000 
feet. The 314th arrived completely undetected, until it was too late. Only fourteen minutes into 
the raid, an inferno had been ignited in Tokyo. The atmosphere in Tokyo was a nightmare, fires 
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blazing as far as 16 square kilometers, with hundreds of thousands of buildings on fire. 62 
 The Japanese had approximately 638 anti-aircraft guns, 90 fighter jets, and 8,000 
professional and civilian firefighters stationed throughout Tokyo. This was never going to be 
enough to deter the results that the 325 bombers had brought that night. However, in hopes to 
lessen sinking morale in the empire, Japanese newspapers printed stories about Japanese pilots 
who saw some success during the raid. One such pilot was Lt. Heikichi Yoshizawa.  
“Lieutenant Yoshizawa, who shot down two B-29’s and damaged several others in a 
series of B-29 raids on Tokyo, also damaged another B-29 when the enemy attacked the Kanto 
District.. Although his plane was damaged by enemy gunfire, he deliberately launched a 
ramming attack on another enemy plane and downed it, thereby meeting a glorious death.”63 
 Snippets like this were printed in many Japanese newspapers throughout the empire. This 
was to keep the illusion that the Japanese were somehow winning during these raids. The truth 
was quite the opposite. LeMay’s bombers were bringing the most destruction Japan had ever 
faced, over 100,000 Japanese people were killed. It took 70 years to rebuild Tokyo.64  
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What Happens Next 
 For the remaining six months that the war lasted, to the second atomic bomb which was 
dropped on Nagasaki on August 15th, 1945, the Americans firebombed ninety Japanese cities. 
This campaign by the Americans is considered the most deadly aerial campaign ever to take 
place. However, none of the fire bombings , or even the atomic bombing matched the casualties 
of the night of March 9th. The firebombing of Tokyo truly marked a new era for American air 
power. There was no other air force in the world which was as feared as the Americans. This was 
the mentality of the American government that enabled men like Curtis LeMay to tap into new 
powers, which created the most dominating military service on the planet. Two years after the 
Japanese surrendered, the United States officially recognized the Air Force as the 5th branch of 
the armed forces. Curtis LeMay was moved to the Joint Chief of Staff where he ran the Air Force 
from the Pentagon. His obsession with napalm bombing would follow him through the Korean 
war and into Vietnam. “We’ll bomb North Vietnam back to the stone age.”66 By this point in 
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time LeMay was unpopular amongst the American people for his ruthless tactics, and his blatant 
disregard for human life. He retired from the Air Force in 1965 and died October 1st, 1990. In a 
meeting held in the United Nations in 1980, a vote was taken to ban the usage of napalm against 
civilian targets.  
 The lessons from World War II bombing should never be forgotten. The supreme 
commander of the United States Forces in the European theatre and the 34th president of the 
United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower left office giving one of the important addresses to the 
American people of the 20th century. He recognized the growth of the military industrial 
complex becoming an international player. He warned the American people the dangers that 
would follow from this. In a century, there were four major wars which led to great suffering and 
death. The corporations that were involved in creating the bombers from World War II have 
made it a part of their business to constantly be creating and selling weapons of war.  
“This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new 
in the American experience. The total influence-economic, political, even spiritual-is felt in 
every city, every state house, every office of the Federal government. Yet we must not fail to 
comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the 
very structure of our society. in the councils of government, we must guard against the 
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial 
complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. Down 
the long lane of history yet to be written America knows that this world of ours, ever growing 
smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be, instead, a proud 
confederation of mutual trust and respect.”67  
 With a growing military industry, it is essential that people recognize when governments 
try to racialize enemies, or divide us based on racial differences. The lessons which were learned 
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